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CATEGORY = 2

M = 281

MESSAGE = 00031548

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~~SECRET~~ SAVIN SECTION ONE OF FIVE XXMMENP01-TB12048 ISHTAR 2/0/VCK-E/R4-68  
SUPPLEMENT 4 AVC, KUS/AVIA-A, DOCT-A, OPER-M/E.I. ALL PORTIONS OF THIS REPORT  
CONTAIN ISHTAR MATERIAL. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM  
SIGINT-REFLECTED OPERATIONS AND POSTURE XXCC I. INTRODUCTION THIS REPORT  
SUMMARIZES THE SIGINT-REFLECTED OPERATIONAL PATTERNS OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE  
(DRV) AIR AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES DURING THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY 1968. THE BASIC  
REPORT CONCERNED THE PERIOD JULY- SEPTEMBER 1967, WHILE SUBSEQUENT SUPPLEMENTS  
HAVE DISCUSSED ACTIVITY DURING OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1967, DECEMBER 1967, AND  
JANUARY 1968, RESPECTIVELY. AIR DEFENSE ACTIVITY IN THE DRV DURING FEBRUARY,  
PARTICULARLY FIGHTER AIRCRAFT ACTIVITY, SHOWED INCREASES OVER JANUARY LEVELS.  
AT LEAST 351 SORTIES WERE FLOWN BY KOREAN AND NORTH VIETNAMESE PILOTS. SOVIET  
PILOTS FLEW TEN SORTIES, SOME OF WHICH WERE POSSIBLY TEST FLIGHTS IN NEWLY  
ASSEMBLED MIG-21.S AND SOME OF WHICH WERE FLIGHTS IN UMIG-21 AIRCRAFT IN WHICH  
NORTH VIETNAMESE PILOTS WERE BEING TRAINED. NORTH VIETNAMESE MIG-21.S  
INTRODUCED A METHOD OF ATTACK INVOLVING THE USE OF TWO MIG-21.S IN ONE FLIGHT  
AND ONE MIG-21 IN ANOTHER. BOTH FLIGHTS ARE COMMITTED SIMULTANEOUSLY AGAINST  
INGRESSING ELEMENTS OF A HOSTILE STRIKE FORCE. THREE USAF AIRCRAFT (AN F-102, AN  
F-105 AND AN F-4) ON 3, 5 AND 23 FEBRUARY RESPECTIVELY WERE LOST IN AERIAL  
COMBAT DURING FEBRUARY - ALL TO DRV-PILOTED MIG-21.S. NO USN AIRCRAFT WERE LOST  
IN AERIAL COMBAT. SIGINT-REFLECTED LOSSES OF DRV AIRCRAFT IN AERIAL COMBAT  
OCCURRED ON THE 6TH, WHEN A DRV PILOTED MIG-21 WAS LOST. ON THE 12TH, WHEN A  
KORCOM PILOTED MIG-21 WAS LOST. AND ON THE 14TH, WHEN A DRV-PILOTED MIG-16 WAS  
LOST. A PORTION OF THE DRV IL-28 FORCE RETURNED TO NORTH VIETNAM DURING THE  
MONTH. THESE AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN BASED AT YUNNANI SINCE MAY 1967. THE ONLY IL-28  
ACTIVITY CONDUCTED DURING FEBRUARY WERE FLIGHTS APPARENTLY DESIGNED TO  
AVOID U.S. STRIKE ACTIVITY, AND SOME NIGHT TRAINING((1)). THERE WERE NO  
SIGNIFICANT ALTERNATIONS IN SAM TACTICS OR OVERALL STRUCTURE OF THE SYSTEM  
DURING FEBRUARY. SIGINT INDICATED THAT DRV SAM.S WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE  
DESTRUCTION OF AT LEAST FOUR U.S. AIRCRAFT. II. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE  
A. TACTICAL CONTROL SYSTEM 1. AN INDICATION OF THE TYPE CONTROL TO WHICH DRV  
AND KOREAN PILOTS ARE SUBJECTED CAN BE SEEN BY EXAMINING A SPECIFIC ASPECT OF  
THE TACTICAL CONTROL SYSTEM. KOREAN-PILOTED MIG-21.S STAGED FROM PHUC YEN, AND  
KOREAN-PILOTED MIG-16.S STAGED FROM KEP (EXCEPT ON ONE OCCASION WHEN THEY

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STAGED FROM PHUC YEN). WHENEVER THE KOREAN-PILOTED MIG-21.S AND MIG-17.S WERE INVOLVED IN THE SAME REACTION, THE MIG-21.S WERE CONTROLLED BY THE SAME GROUND CONTROLLER AND ON THE SAME FREQUENCY AS THE MIG-17.S. IN FEBRUARY, DRV-PILOTED MIG-21.S STAGED FROM PHUC YEN AND DRV-PILOTED MIG-17.S STAGED FROM HANOI GIA AM. WHENEVER THE MIG-21.S AND THE MIG-17.S WERE INVOLVED IN THE SAME REACTION, THE MIG-21.S WERE CONTROLLED BY A DIFFERENT GROUND CONTROLLER AND ON A DIFFERENT FREQUENCY FROM THE MIG-17.S. THE REASON FOR THE DIFFERENCE IN CONTROL APPEARS TO BE DETERMINED BY THE AREA AND THE TYPE OF REACTION. THE KOREAN-PILOTED MIG-21.S PATROLLED OVER KEP AND TO THE NORTH AND NORTH-EAST OF KEP, WHILE THE KOREAN-PILOTED MIG-17.S PATROLLED IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF KEP. CONSEQUENTLY, USE OF THE SAME FREQUENCY AND COMMON GROUND CONTROLLER FOR KORCOM.S SEEMED TO SIMPLIFY OPERATIONAL CONTROL. THE MAJORITY OF KOREAN GROUND-TO-AIR COMMUNICATIONS CONSISTS OF THE HOSTILE AIRCRAFT.S LOCATION. PRECISE VECTORING INSTRUCTIONS ARE NOT USUALLY NOTED. THE CONTROL FUNCTION OPERATES DIFFERENTLY FOR DRV-PILOTED FIGHTERS IN REACTION. MIG-21.S ARE KEPT UNDER VERY CLOSE CONTROL FROM THE MOMENT THEY LEAVE THEIR HOME BASE, PHUC YEN, UNTIL THE REACTION IS COMPLETE AND THEY RETURN. XXHH 900 NNNN

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38A 103183H  
ZKZK RR HAH DE  
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TO OSCAR/UNIFORM SIERRA  
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~~SECRET~~ SAVIN FINAL SECTION OF FIVE XXMMENP05FTB12048 ISHTAR-  
270/VCK-E/R4-68 SUPPLEMENT 4 (AVC, KUS/AVIA-A, DOCT-A, OPER-M/E, I). ALL PORTIONS OF  
THIS REPORT CONTAIN ISHTAR MATERIAL. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM  
SIGINT-REFLECTED OPERATIONS AND POSTURE XXCC 2. DRV REACTION TO GULF OF TONKIN  
INGRESS/EGRESS CONTINUING TO DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO OPERATE IN THE EAST AS  
WELL AS IN THE WEST, DRV MIGS REACTED AT LEAST FIVE TIMES DURING FEBRUARY  
TO U.S. STRIKE AIRCRAFT ENTERING THE DRV FROM AND EXITING TO THE GULF OF  
TONKIN. ON 12 FEBRUARY, TWO KOREAN-PILOTED MIG-21S REACTED FROM PHUC YEN TO A  
FLIGHT OF EIGHT HOSTILE AIRCRAFT DEPARTING THE DRV. WHILE BEING VECTORED INTO A  
FAVORABLE ATTACK POSITION, HOWEVER, THE MIG PILOTS WERE ATTACKED BY A FLIGHT OF  
F-4S AND ONE OF THE MIGS WAS DESTROYED. ON 23 FEBRUARY, ONE DRV-PILOTED MIG-21  
REACTED TO USAF STRIKE AIRCRAFT COMING INTO NORTH VIETNAM FROM THE GULF OF  
TONKIN. THE MIG TOOK OFF FROM PHUC YEN AS THE HOSTILE AIRCRAFT INGRESSED, AND  
THE MIG ESTABLISHED AN ORBITAL HOLDING PATTERN EAST OF PHUC YEN AND SOUTH OF  
KEP. AS THE STRIKE AIRCRAFT BEGAN TO DEPART THE DRV AFTER STRIKING TARGETS  
NORTH OF THE HANOI/PHUC YEN AREA, THE MIG PILOT WAS TOLD TO INITIATE INTERCEPT  
PROCEDURES AND TO TRY TO STRIKE THE HOSTILES NEAR DONG TRIEU (21-05N 106-32E).  
THE MIG WAS VECTORED INTO A HIGH, TAIL CHASE POSITION AFTER A FLIGHT OF F-4S.  
AN ATTACK WAS MADE. ONE AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE WAS FIRED AND ONE F-4 WAS DESTROYED.  
IN THESE AND THE OTHER INSTANCES WHEN DRV MIGS ENGAGED OR ATTEMPTED TO ENGAGE  
HOSTILE AIRCRAFT COMING IN FROM THE GULF OF TONKIN, THEY WAITED FOR THE STRIKE  
AIRCRAFT TO EGRESS BEFORE ATTACKING. HOWEVER, ON THE BASIS OF PAST DRV  
FIGHTER OPERATIONS, IT CAN BE EXPECTED THAT DRV GCI CONTROLLERS WILL TAKE  
ADVANTAGE OF ANY SITUATION THEY CONSIDER FAVORABLE, INVOLVING EITHER INGRESSING  
OR EGRESSING AIRCRAFT. III. SAM OPERATIONS DURING FEBRUARY 1968, THE DRV  
SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEM ACCOUNTED FOR THE LOSS OF AT LEAST FOUR U.S.  
AIRCRAFT. A VINH AREA BATTALION AT 18-48N 105-19E SHOT DOWN AN USN F-8E WHILE  
ANOTHER VINH AREA BATTALION AT 18-25N 105-48E, SHOT DOWN A USN A-1H. ONE OTHER  
TWO AIRCRAFT, AN F-105 AND AN A-1H, WERE SHOT DOWN BY A PHUC YEN AREA UNIT AT  
21-24N 105-32E AND A HANOI AREA BATTALION IN THE VICINITY OF 20-56N 105-58E,  
RESPECTIVELY. SAM COMMUNICATIONS DURING FEBRUARY CONTINUED TO REFLECT THE  
IMPORTANCE PLACED ON TRAINING OF SAM PERSONNEL TO COUNTER U.S. STRIKE AIRCRAFT.  
ON 22 FEBRUARY, FOR EXAMPLE, A HAOI AREA BATTALION REPORTED THAT HOSTILE

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AIRCRAFT HAD BOMBED NEAR HIS SITE. THIS STATEMENT PROMPTED A REMARK, PROBABLY FROM THE SITE'S CONTROLLER, ABOUT THE UNIT'S POOR COMBAT PERFORMANCE DURING OTHER RECENT ENGAGEMENTS, ALONG WITH FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS THAT TRAINING WOULD BEGIN FORTHWITH. NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN TACTICS OR IN THE OVERALL STRUCTURE OF THE DRV SAM SYSTEM WERE NOTED IN FEBRUARY. ((1)) FOR A RECAPITULATION OF RECENT IL-28 ACTIVITY IN THE DRV, SEE 2/O/VCA/R7-68, 232341Z FEBRUARY 1968. ((2)) MIG PRACTICE-GCI TACTICS WERE DISCUSSED IN 2/O/VCA/R14-67, 291749Z JUNE 1967. ((3)) THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOVIET TEST FLIGHT ACTIVITY AND THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW MIG-21 AIRCRAFT AND PILOTS IS DISCUSSED IN 2/O/VCA/R18-67, 251715Z SEPTEMBER 1967. ((4)) THIS TREND TOWARD TENACITY WAS DISCUSSED IN DETAIL IN SUPPLEMENT 3 TO 2/O/VCK-E/R41-67, #12#27Z MARCH 1968. XXHH 9#N NNNN

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